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TAX LAW 
IN RE KROY (EUROPE) LIMITED: WHETHER 
A CORPORATION MAY AMORTIZE AND 
DEDUCT LOAN FEES INCURRED IN 
FINANCING A STOCK REDEMPTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, l the Ninth Circuit held 
that a corporation could amortize and deduct fees which it 
incurred in borrowing funds used to redeem stock under § 
162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.2 Section 162(a) allows a 
corporation to deduct ordinary and necessary business expens-
es.3 Kroy required the court to decide whether § 162(k) of the 
Internal Revenue Code,4 an exception to § 162(a), applied to 
1. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1994) (per McLaughlin, 
J.; the other panel members were Leavy, J., and Reinhardt, J.). . 
2. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370. The pertinent portions of I.R.C. § 162(a) provide: 
"[tlhere shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses 
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness ... " I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
3. See I.R.C. § 162(a). 
4. The pertinent portions of I.R.C. § 162(k) provide: 
(1) IN GENERAL. - Except as provided in paragraph (2), no 
deduction otherwise allowable shall be allowed under this 
chapter for any amount paid or incurred by a corporation 
in connection with the redemption of its stock. 
(2) EXCEPl'IONS. - Paragraph (1) shall not apply to -
(A) CERTAIN SPECIFIC DEDUCTIONS. - Any -
(j) deduction allowable under section 
163 (relating to interest), or 
(ii) deduction for dividends paid (within the 
meaning of section 561). 
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these fees and would preclude their deduction.5 Section 162(k) 
disallows deduction of any expenses incurred "in connection 
with" a stock redemption.s The Ninth Circuit determined that 
§ 162(k) did not apply to the fees because the fees were in-
curred in a separate borrowing transaction which was not "in 
connection with" the stock redemption.7 
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court decision and affirmed an earlier bankruptcy court hold-
ing.s 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Kroy is a corporation that manufactures computer-based 
lettering systems.9 In 1986, Kroy's management decided to 
take Kroy private in a leveraged buyout transaction (hereinaf-
ter "LBO").IO Kroy lacked sufficient funds to repurchase its 
stock.ll Therefore, Kroy borrowed $60.6 million from First 
Bank of Minneapolis and Quest Equities Corp. to finance the 
LBO.12 To obtain the loans, Kroy paid loan fees totaling 
$4,091,170.13 For tax purposes, Kroy amortized and deducted 
5. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. 
6. See I.R.C. § 162(k). 
7. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370. 
8. See id. at 368. 
9. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1994). Kroy is 
principally engaged in the manufacture and marketing of computer-based lettering 
systems as well as the sale of signs and sign systems. In re Kroy (Europe) Limit-
ed, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 1992). 
10. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1994). In 
December 1986, Kroy became a private company in a leveraged buyout transaction 
in which Kroy merged with Kappa Acquisition Corporation to form a new merged 
Kroy. Kroy, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, at *2. Kappa was formed for the purpose of 
taking Kroy private. [d. The stockholders of the new Kroy were pre-LBO Kroy 
management, several investors and the Kappa Acquisition Corporation Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan. [d. All pre-LBO common shares of Kroy which were out-
standing prior to the merger were bought back for cash. In re Kroy (Europe) Lim-
ited, No. CIV. 92-491, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17169, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 1992). 
11. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. 
12. [d. 
13. [d. The loan fees consisted of: i) an advisory fee of $1,200,000 and a place-
ment fee of $625,000 to Bankers Trust Corporation, ii) a credit arrangement and 
facility fee of $1,000,000 to Quest, iii) a commitment fee, closing fee and bank 
agent fee totaling $667,000 to First Bank, and iv) $599,170 for reimbursement of 
the legal and accounting fees of Bankers Trust, Quest and First Bank. [d. The 
court noted that Bankers Trust acted as Kroy's investment banker, but did not 
2
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the loan fees under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code14 as 
ordinary and necessary business expenses.15 
The Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") audited 
Kroy's tax returns for the tax years ending March 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989 and 1990, and disallowed Kroy's amortization de-
ductions for the loan fees. 1s This disallowance resulted in a 
net tax deficiency for Kroy.17 In 1990,Kroy voluntarily filed 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. IS 
The government submitted a proof of claim19 to the bankrupt-
cy court for unpaid corporate income taxes.20 Kroy objected to 
the deficiency claim and requested that the bankruptcy 
court21 determine its tax liability under 11 U.S.C. § 505.22 
The parties submitted the dispute to the bankruptcy court on 
stipulated facts and cross motions for summary judgment.23 
The bankruptcy court granted Kroy's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that the loan fees were ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses which could be amortized and deducted 
under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.24 The bankrupt-
cy court determined that § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which disallows deduction of any expenses incurred "in 
loan funds to Kroy. 1d. at 368 n.1. 
14. See supra note 2 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(a). 
15. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. 
16. 1d. 
17. 1d. The IRS determined that Kroy owed a tax deficiency of $270,391 for 
the taxable year ending March 1988. Kroy, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, at *4. Addi-
tionally, the IRS determined that Kroy made overpayments to the IRS for 1983 
and 1986 equaling $137,291. 1d. In lieu of requesting a refund, Kroy applied that 
amount to the amount owing so that Kroy owed a balance of $133,640. 1d. This 
amount plus accrued interest of $109,015 equalled $242,655 which was the total 
deficiency claimed by the government. See id. at *4-*5. 
18. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-63 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
19. A proof of claim is a statement under oath filed in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing by a creditor in which the creditor sets forth the amount owed and sufficient 
detail to identify the basis for the claim. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 845 (6th ed. 
1991). 
20. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. 
21. United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona. 
22. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. Section 505 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
provides that a bankruptcy court may determine a debtor's tax liability that has 
not been contested before or adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal 
prior to a debtor's filing in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 505 (1994). 
23. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. 
24. See Kroy, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, at *12. 
3
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connection with" a stock redemption, did not apply to the loan 
fees and, thus, would not preclude the deductions.25 The court 
reasoned that the loan fees were not incurred "in connection 
with" the stock redemption within the meaning of § 162(k), 
but, instead, were incurred in a separate borrowing transac-
tion.26 The government appealed to the district court.27 
On appeal, the district court28 reversed and disallowed 
Kroy's deductions for the loan fees. 29 The district court held 
that § 162(k) applied to the loan fees and precluded their de-
duction.30 The court reasoned that the loan fees were incurred 
"in connection with" a stock redemption because Kroy paid the 
loan fees to secure debt capital which was used to repurchase 
the stock.31 Kroy appealed to the Ninth Circuit.32 
III. BACKGROUND 
Whether § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue Code33 applies 
to and, thus, precludes deduction of expenses that a corpora-
tion incurs in securing a loan to finance a stock redemption 
has implications for most LBO and stock redemption completed 
since the enactment of the statute in 1986.34 There are hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, and perhaps billions of dollars, at 
stake in amortization deductions for fees that companies pay to 
investment bankers, financial institutions, lawyers, and ac-
countants to handle the buyback of their stock.35 
The courts36 and the IRS37 have previously determined 
25. See id. 
26. See id. at *10. 
27. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. 
28. United States District Court, District of Arizona. 
29. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. 
30. See Kroy, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17169, at *13. 
31. See id. at "'10. 
32. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368. 
33. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k). 
34. See Thomas Pratt, Court Rules LBO Debt Fees Non·Deductible, MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS REPORT, Nov. 30, 1992, at 1. 
35. Claudia MacLachlan, Conflict Emerges In Rulings On Fee Deductions; The 
Supreme Court May Have to Settle a Split Over Deducting Fees Paid In LBO 
Financings, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at A7. 
36. See, e.g., Detroit Consol. Theaters Inc. v. Comm'r, 133 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 
4
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that a corporation may amortize and deduct fees and expenses 
related to acquiring a loan over the life of the loan as ordinary 
and necessary business expenses under § 162(a).38 However, 
the enactment of § 162(k) raises a question as to whether fees 
incurred to finance a redemption of corporate stock are subject 
to this treatment.39 Section 162(k) provides an exception to 
the general rule of § 162(a) that ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses are deductible.40 By its terms, § 162(k) denies a 
deduction for "any amount paid or incurred by a corporation in 
connection with the redemption of its stock."41 
Congress enacted § 162(k) to address the deductibility of 
"greenmail" payments.42 "Greenmail" payments are payments 
that a corporation makes to repurchase its stock from share-
holders intent on a hostile takeover of the repurchasing corpo-
ration.43 A corporation's payment for repurchase or redemp-
tion of its own stock had long been viewed as a capital expense 
with the consequence that both the repurchase payments and 
the legal, brokerage, and accounting fees incurred incident to 
the transaction could not be deducted.44 However, during the 
1942) (per curiam) (finding that commissions paid during the taxable year which 
represented the cost to petitioner of securing two long-term loans were not deduct-
ible in full in the year when paid but should be spread ratably over the period of 
the loans). See also Anover Realty Corp. v. Comm'r, 33 T.C. 671, 675 (1960) (de-
termining that it is proper for a taxpayer to amortize the expenses it incurred in 
securing the mortgage loans over the life of the loans). 
37. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-67, 1986-1 C.B. 238 (expenses incurred to obtain a 
loan are capital expenditures that must be amortized over the period of the loan). 
38. See Glenn N. Goergen & Gus H. Vlahadamis, Taxability of Fees in Financ-
ing a Stock Redemption, THE TAX ADVISER, March 1993, at 74. See supra note 2 
for the text of I.R.C. § 162(a). 
39. See Goergen & Vlahadamis, supra note 38, at 74. 
40. Lee A. Sheppard, The Tax Treatment of LBO Fees, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
Sept. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, at 94 TNT 185-5. 
41. I.R.C. § 162(k). See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k). 
42. See' S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (1986). The Senate Com-
mittee Report provides the following as the reason for enacting I.R.C. § 162(k): 
The [Senate) [C)ommittee understands that some corporate 
taxpayers are taking the [erroneous) position that expen-
ditures incurred to repurchase stock from stockholders to 
prevent a hostile takeover of the corporation by such 
shareholders - so-called "greenmail" payments - are de-
ductible business expenses. 
S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (1986). 
43. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 485 (6th ed. 1991). 
44. Elliot Pisem, Courts Split on Deductibility of Loan Fees, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 1, 
5
Lorndale: Tax Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
156 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:151 
corporate takeover frenzy of the 1980s, corporate taxpayers 
relied upon Five Star Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner45 as 
authority to justify deduction of such stock repurchase or 
"greenmail" payments.46 Consequently, Congress added a new 
provision, subsection (k) of § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
to provide an explicit rule prohibiting deduction of "greenmail" 
payments, thereby reversing the effect of Five Star.47 
However, the language and legislative history of § 162(k) 
indicate that the statute may transcend simple clarification of 
the law concerning "greenmail" payments.48 Congress' use of 
the words "otherwise allowable"49 to describe the deductions 
to which § 162(k) applies may suggest intent to cut off previ-
ously permissible deductions. 50 In other words, deductions 
that had previously been allowable in other contexts would no 
longer be allowable in the context of a stock redemption under 
§ 162(k).51 In addition, the Senate Committee Report, which 
the Conference Committee Report generally follows, states that 
§ 162(k) is not limited to hostile takeover situations, but ap-
plies to any corporate stock redemption. 52 Notwithstanding 
1994, at 5 (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 277 (1987». 
45. Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966). In Five Star, 
the court held that a corporation could deduct as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses funds paid to redeem stock where such redemption was necessary for the 
survival of the corporation. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 370 
(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Five Star, 355 F.2d at 727). 
46. See Pisem, supra note 44, at 5. 
47. See id. 
48. Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63, 
at *26 (T.C. Aug. 24, 1994). 
49. I.R.C. § 162(k) provides in pertinent part: "no deduction otherwise allow-
able shall be allowed under this chapter for any amount paid or incurred by a 
corporation in connection with the redemption of its stock." I.R.C. § 162(k). 
50. See Sheppard, supra note 40, at 94 TNT 185-5. 
51. See id. 
52. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 223 (1986). The Senate Com-
mittee Report provides guidance as to the scope of Congress' intended application 
of I.R.C. § 162(k): 
The committee wishes to provide expressly that all expen-
ditures by a corporation incurred in purchasing its own 
stock, whether representing direct consideration for the 
stock, a premium payment above the apparent stock val-
ue, or costs incident to the purchase, are nonamortizable 
capital expenditures. . . . 
This provision is not limited to hostile takeover 
6
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the Senate Committee Report, the intended scope of § 162(k) 
remains uncertain because the Conference Committee Report 
does not contain this statement. 53 Thus, the consequence of 
the statute's language and legislative history may be that § 
162(k) is more than a mere clarification of the law concerning 
the deductibility of "greenmail" payments.54 Section 162(k) 
may, in a broad and sweeping manner, have been intended to 
prevent the deduction of any redemption-related expenses.55 
The United States Tax Court, in Fort Howard Corp. v. 
Commissioner,56 considered whether § 162(k) precludes a cor-
porate taxpayer from amortizing and deducting the costs and 
fees which were paid to obtain debt capital used in an LBO.57 
The tax court held that § 162(k) is applicable in these circum-
stances and that amortization and deduction of the costs and 
fees are, thus, precluded. 58 T:p.e tax court found that the lan-
guage59 and legislative history60 of § 162(k) support a broad 
situations, but applies to any corporate stock redemption. 
The committee intends that amounts subject to this provi-
sion will include amounts paid to repurchase stock, premi-
ums paid for the stock, legal, accounting, brokerage, 
transfer agent, appraisal and similar fees incurred in 
connection with the repurchase and any other expenditure 
that is necessary or incident to the repurchase. . . . 
S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 223 (1986). 
53. See, e.g., In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that § 162(k) is a codification and clarification of existing law concerning 
"greenmail" payments, although the court did not use the term "greenmail."). But 
see Fort Howard Corp., 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63, at *26-*27 (stating that § 
162(k) is more than a mere clarification of the law concerning "greenmail" pay-
ments and that § 162(k) overrides existing law where costs associated with any 
stock redemption are concerned). 
54. See Sheppard, supra note 40, at 94 TNT 185-5. 
55. See id. 
56. Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63 
(T.C. Aug. 24, 1994). 
57. Id. at *14. In Fort Howard Corp., the corporate taxpayer, Fort Howard 
Corp., incurred expenses in obtaining loans to finance the repurchase of its stock 
in a leveraged buyout transaction. See id. at *11-*12. The corporate taxpayer am-
ortized and deducted these expenditures on its 1988 income tax return. See id. at 
*12. The IRS disallowed these deductions on the ground that § 162(k) precludes 
such deductions. See id. at *2. 
58. See Fort Howard Corp., 1994 U.S. Tax. Ct. LEXIS 63, at *19. 
59. The tax court reasoned that the words in a revenue act should be inter-
preted in their ordinary, everyday sense. Id. at *16. It noted that the phrase "in 
connection with" has been interpreted broadly and means "associated with, or 
related." See id. at *16-*17. Further, the tax court reasoned that events or ele-
7
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interpretation of the statute and require its applicatiori to the 
fees paid to obtain debt capital for an LBO.61 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In In re Kroy (Europe) Limited,62 the Ninth Circuit first 
determined that § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue Code63 did 
not apply to and, thus, would not preclude deduction of the 
loan fees.64 Subsequently, the court made its determination 
that the loan fees could be amortized and deducted as ordinary 
and necessary business expenses under § 162(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.55 
A. SECTION 162(K) DOES NOT PRECLUDE AMORTIZATION OF 
THE LOAN FEES 
The court set the groundwork for its analysis by first ad-
dressing whether § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue Code pre-
cludes amortization and deduction of the loan fees in view of 
the fact that Kroy procured and used the loan to redeem its 
stock.66 
ments are "connected" when they are "logically related." Id. at *17. As a factual 
matter, the court found that Fort Howard Corp. used the debt capital obtained via 
the expenditures in question to finance the redemption. Id. The court, accordingly, 
concluded that there was a clear, logical relation between Fort Howard Corp.'s 
stock redemption, the corresponding need for financing, and the costs incurred to 
obtain that financing. Id. Thus, the tax court determined that the loan fees were 
incurred "in connection with" the stock redemption with the consequence that their 
deduction is precluded under § 162(k). See id. at *19. 
60. The tax court cited the Conference Committee Report which provides in 
pertinent part: "the phrase 'in connection with a redemption' is intended to be con-
strued broadly .... " Id. at *20 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 168 (1986». 
61. See Fort Howard Corp., 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63, at *19. 
62. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1994). 
63. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k). 
64. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370. 
65. See id. See supra note 2 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(a). 
66. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 369 (9th Cir. 1994). 
8
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1. Narrow Interpretation of § 162(k): Plain Meaning of 
§ 162(k) Is Not Conclusive As To Its Application to the 
Loan Fees 
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the plain 
meaning of § 162(k) of the Internal Revenue Code necessarily 
includes the loan fees because they stem from borrowings used 
to finance a share repurchase program.67 The court found the 
statute's plain meaning to be inconclusive as to whether Kroy's 
loan fees are to be considered as incurred "in connection with" 
the stock redemption.68 
After making the threshold determination that the plain 
meaning of § 162(k) does not require application of the statute 
to Kroy's loan fees, the Ninth Circuit considered two additional 
arguments made by the government which related to interpre-
tation of the statute.69 First, the court rejected the 
government's suggestion that the words "otherwise allow-
able,,,70 which Congress used to describe the deductions to 
which the statute applies, indicate that deductions which were 
allowable in other contexts are no longer allowable in the con-
text of a stock redemption.71 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this 
argument by reasoning that before § 162(k) can be applied, the 
court, nevertheless, must determine whether or not an expen-
67. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 368-69. 
68. See id. at 369. The court rejected the government's principal contention 
that § 162(k) is to be interpreted to include the loan fees. See id. It found that 
this interpretation of § 162(k) requires that the business purpose for the use of 
the borrowed funds be ascertained to determine deductibility. [d. The court noted 
that under the government's theory, if the business purpose for borrowing the 
funds is to redeem stock, then the loan fees are not deductible. [d. However, if 
the funds are borrowed for some other business purpose, then the identical loan 
fees may be deductible. [d. The court concluded that this is the uncertainty which 
the Supreme Court rejected in Woodward u. Commissioner and United States u. 
Gilmore. [d. See infra notes 80, 84 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Woodward and Gilmore. Further, the court found an expansive reading of § 162(k) 
unnecessary because it reasoned the statute to be a codification and clarification of 
existing law specifically concerning the treatment of funds paid to redeem stock in 
order to avoid a hostile takeover. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370. Accordingly, the court 
dismissed the government's argument that the plain meaning of the phrase "in 
connection with" the stock redemption necessarily includes the loan fees. See id. at 
369. 
69. See id. at 369 n.3. 
70. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k). 
71. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369 n.3. 
9
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diture was incurred "in connection with" a stock redemption.72 
The government's second argument, which related to stat-
utory interpretation, concerned the exception under § 162(k) 
which permits the deduction of interest expense73 incurred in 
connection with a stock redemption.74 The government sug-
gested that the existence of this exception raised an inference 
that other loan-related costs, such as loan fees, could not be 
deducted.76 The court refused to draw this inference.76 The 
court reasoned that Congress did not need to specifically in-
clude an exception for expenditures such as loan fees because 
these expenditures had been deductible for many years.77 An 
exception for loan fees would only be required if the loan fees 
were incurred "in connection with" a stock redemption.78 
After the court concluded that a literal construction of § 
162(k) failed to provide guidance as to whether the loan fees 
were incurred "in connection with" the stock redemption, it 
confronted the issue of determining which test to apply.79 
2. Selection of the Origin of the Claim Test to Determine 
Whether or Not the Loan Fees Were Incurred In Connection 
With the Stock Redemption 
The court concluded that the "origin of the claim" test 
established by the United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. Gilmore80 was the proper legal inquiry for determin-
72. See id. 
73. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162{k). 
74. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369 n.3. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369 n.3. The court concluded that the interest excep-
tion was included in § 162{k) to provide deductibility in the situation where a 
corporation pays interest on a promissory note issued to a shareholder whose stock 
was repurchased. 1d. Absent the exception, § 162{k) would preclude deduction of 
such interest expense. 1d. 
79. See id. at 369. 
80. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). In Gilmore, the issue was 
whether litigation expenses incurred by the husband in divorce proceedings were 
deductible as a business expense, rather than nondeductible as a personal expense. 
See id. at 40. The husband argued that the litigation expenses were incurred to 
resist the wife's claim to his assets which included controlling stock interests in 
10
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ing whether or not the loan fees were incurred "in connection 
with" the stock redemption8l within the meaning of § 
162(k).82 Under the "origin of the claim" test, a court exam-
ines the origin and character of the taxpayer's expenditure, but 
does not consider the taxpayer's motives or purposes in incur-
ring the expenditure.83 The Ninth Circuit adopted this ap-
proach on the ground that the Supreme Court has relied on 
this test to determine the nature and, thus, the deductibility of 
taxpayer expenditures.84 Moreover, the court noted that the 
three General Motors automobile dealerships. See id. at 40-41. The husband was 
the president and principal managing officer of the three dealerships. See id. at 
41. The Supreme Court held that the "origin and character of the claim with re-
spect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences 
upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the 
expense was 'business' or 'personal' and, hence, whether it is deductible or 
not .... " Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49. Consequently, the court found that the origin 
of the husband's expenditures was in the divorce proceedings and, therefore, the 
expenditures were personal and nondeductible even though they had been incurred 
for a business purpose. Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370 (citing Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 51-52). 
81. Contra Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. 
LEXIS 63, at *33-*40 (T.C. Aug. 24, 1994) (reasoning that the appropriate test for 
determining applicability of § 162(k) to the loan fees is found in the language of 
the statute itself and that application of the origin of the claim test is unneces-
sary). 
82. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369. 
83. See Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49 . 
. 84. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369-70 (citing Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49; Woodward v. 
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 578 (1970». The origin of the claim test was used to char-
acterize an expenditure as either business or personal in Gilmore and to deter-
mine whether taxpayer expenditures were deductible business expenses or nonde-
ductible capital expenditures in Woodward. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369-70. In Wood-
ward, the taxpayers were majority stockholders of an Iowa corporation who had 
voted in favor of a perpetual extension of the corporate charter and had, conse-
quently, incurred the obligation to purchase stock owned by dissenting sharehold-
ers at its real value. See Woodward, 397 U.S. at 573. As the two parties could not 
. agree on the real value of the stock, appraisal litigation ensued in which the tax-
payers incurred $25,000 in expenses. See id. at 573-74. The taxpayers deducted 
these expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses on their federal in-
come tax returns. See id. at 574. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the 
deduction because the fees "represented capital expenditures incurred in connection 
with the acquisition of capital stock of a corporation." [d. The Supreme Court 
found that the proper inquiry for determining whether the fees were deductible 
business expenses or nondeductible capital expenditures was the "origin of the 
claim" test. See id. at 578. Significantly, the Court rejected the "primary purpose" 
test which required examining the business purpose for which the expenditure was 
incurred. See Woodward, 397 U.S. at 577. The Supreme Court noted that the 
"primary purpose" test was "uncertain and difficult" and that a test based upon 
the taxpayer's purpose for the expenditure would encourage resort to "formalisms 
and artificial distinctions." See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370 (citing Woodward, 397 U.S. at 
577). Accordingly, the Supreme Court applied the "origin of the claim" test and 
11
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"origin of the claim" test and § 162(k), when interpreted nar-
rowly, yield consistent results.85 Expenditures which have 
their "origin" in a stock redemption transaction are nondeduct-
ible, while those expenditures having their "origin" in a sepa-
rate, although related, transaction remain deductible as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses under § 162(a).86 
3. Application of the Origin of the Claim Test to the Loan 
Fees 
The Ninth Circuit applied the "origin of the claim" test to 
Kroy's loan fees and found that the origin of Kroy's liability for 
the loan fees was the borrowing transaction and not the stock 
redemption transaction.87 For federal income tax purposes, 
the court reasoned that the stock redemption was a transaction 
separate and distinct from the borrowing transaction.88 The 
court found that the loan fees were incurred as compensation 
for services provided to Kroy by its investment banker and 
lenders in the loan transaction.89 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held 
that § 162(k) does not apply as the loan fees were not incurred 
"in connection with" the stock redemption.90 
B. LOAN FEES ARE AMORTIZABLE AND DEDUCTIBLE BUSINESS 
EXPENSE UNDER § 162(A) 
The court subsequently considered whether the loan fees 
could be amortized and deducted under § 162(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.91 The courts and the IRS have traditionally 
concluded that the fees were properly treated as part of the cost of the stock and 
were nondeductible capital expenditures. See Woodward, 397 U.S. at 579. The 
origin of the claim was the acquisition of the capital stock. See ill. The fees were 
incurred in establishing a purchase price which is clearly part of the acquisition 
process. See id. 
85. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 369. 
86. See ill. 
87. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 369 (9th Cir. 1994). 
88. See ill. at 370. 
89. [d. 
90. See id. 
91. See In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1994). The 
government did not argue that a corporation could not amortize and deduct under 
§ 162(a) expenses which it incurred to borrow funds for purposes not covered by § 
162(k). See id. 
12
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treated loan fees as amortizable over the life of the related 
loan.92 Because the loan fees at issue were incurred as com-
pensation for services provided to Kroy by its investment bank-
er and lenders in connection with securing a loan, the court 
found that the loan fees could be amortized and deducted as 
ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code.93 
V. CRITIQUE 
Stripped of all nuance, the opinions of the Ninth Circuit 
and the United States Tax Court disagree over how broadly 
the words "in connection with a redemption"94 are to be inter-
preted.95 The Ninth Circuit view in In re Kroy (Europe) Limit-
ed96 was that § 162(k)97 does not reach loan fees incurred in 
financing a stock redemption, whereas, the tax court view in 
Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner9s was that the statute 
should be read broadly to encompass all expenses with a nexus 
to the redemption transaction.99 
CommentatorslOO have suggested that § 162(k) is not to 
be reduced, as the Ninth Circuit and the tax court have done, 
92. See Glenn N. Goergen & Gus H. Vlahadamis, Taxability of Fees in Financ· 
ing a Stock Redemption, THE TAX ADVISER, March 1993, at 74. See supra notes 
36-38, and infra note 104, and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment 
of loan fees by the courts and the IRS. 
93. See Kroy, 27 F.3d at 370. 
94. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k). 
95. Richard W. Bailine and Christine W. Booth, Kroy: 'Bungling' Ninth Circuit 
Still Got It Right, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li· 
brary, TNT File, at 94 TNT 215-62. 
96. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1994). 
97. See supra note 4 for the text of I.R.C. § 162(k). 
98. Fort Howard Corp v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63 
(T.C. Aug. 24, 1994). See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r. 
99. See Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62. 
100. See, e.g., Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62 (recognizing 
that the crucial preliminary inquiry under § 162(k) is whether the expenses at 
issue are "deductions otherwise allowable"). See also Lee A. Sheppard, The Tax 
Treatment of LBO Fees, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, 
Fedtax Library, TNT File, at 94 TNT 185-5 (stating that the words "in connection 
with a stock redemption" used in § 162(k) are important, but the words "no deduc-
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to the five words "in connection with a redemption" when de-
termining whether or not the statute applies to an expendi-
ture. lOl A faithful reading of the statute would include the 
crucial preliminary inquiry of whether the expenses at is'sue 
are "deduction[s] otherwise allowable."102 In other words, no 
inquiry about whether a particular expense was incurred "in 
connection with a redemption" can be undertaken until it is 
first determined that the expense at issue is an "otherwise 
allowable deduction."103 
Application of this two-step inquiry to determine if § 
162(k) applies to and, thus, precludes deduction of Kroy's loan 
fees yields the following result. If an expense is a loan fee, it 
will be a "deduction otherwise allowable" because of long-
standing precedent which permits amortization deductions for 
loan fees over the lives of the related loans. l04 Consequently, 
the loan fees will next be subject to the "in connection with a 
redemption" inquiry.105 However, if the expense is a loan fee, 
then it must have been incurred in connection with a loan, and 
not "in connection with a redemption."106 Therefore, although 
the loan fee will be within the universe of expenses to which § 
162(k) applies (it is a "deduction otherwise allowable"), it will 
not be affected by the proscriptive language of the statute 
because it is not "in connection with a redemption."107 Con-
sequently, § 162(k) does not preclude Kroy from amortizing 
and deducting the loan fees. lOS 
On the other hand, an expense that is a redemption ex-
pense will be treated differently under § 162(k). Redemption 
expenses are not, and never have been, "deductions otherwise 
101. See BaiJine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62. 
102. See id. 
103. Id. 
104. See id. See, e.g., Cagle v. Comm'r, 539 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976) (stat-
ing that the costs of obtaining a loan are capital expenditures which should be 
capitalized and deducted pro rata over the life of the loan); Enoch v. Comm'r, 57 
T.C. 781, 794-795 (1972) (finding that a loan fee is compensation for services ren-
dered in obtaining a loan and that a loan fee is a capital expenditure amortizable 
over the life of the loan). 
105. See Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. 
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allowable. 'H09 Thus, for redemption expenses, the proscriptive 
language of § 162(k) would never come into play and redemp-
tion expenses would continue to be treated as non-deductible 
capital expenditures.11o 
Application of § 162(k) in this two-step manner to expendi-
tures in question yields sensible results. It does not alter the 
practice of permitting the amortization of loan fees over the 
lives of the related loans.l11 Nor does it affect the long-stand-
ing custom of treating redemption expenses as non-deductible 
capital expenditures. ll2 Moreover, § 162(k) viewed in this 
manner does achieve its principal legislative goal of clarifying 
the treatment of "greenmail" payments.113 Section 162(k) re-
moves any doubt about the possible validity of Five Star Manu-
facturing v. Commissioner114 as support for deducting 
"greenmail" payments. 115 
Even though the Ninth Circuit correctly held that § 162(k) 
did not apply to Kroy's loan fees and, thus, would not preclude 
their deduction under § 162(a), a more satisfying analysis 
would have included consideration of the important initial text 
of § 162(k) which contains the words "deductions otherwise 
allowable."116 By failing to consider these words, the court 
missed an opportunity to provide a sound analytical framework 
for courts deciding questions arising under § 162(k). 
109. [d. (citing Five Star Mfg. v. Comm'r, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966) as a 
single exception). The general rule governing share repurchases and associated 
legal, accounting, and banking costs is that such expenditures are to be capital-
ized. See Sheppard, supra note 100, at 94 TNT 185-5. 
110. See Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. Five Star Mfg. v. Comm'r, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966). See supra note 45 
and accompanying text for a discussion of Five Star. 
115. Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62. Enactment of § 162(k) 
by Congress took an expense (a "greenmail" payment) that arguably, under Five 
Star, had become an "allowable" deduction and returned it to its historical status, 
a non-deductible capital expenditure. See id. Under the initial inquiry, "greenmail" 
payments, perhaps, had become "deductions otherwise allowable" on the authority 
of Five Star. See id. However, under the second step of the inquiry, the 
proscriptive language of § 162(k) would preclude deduction of "greenmail" pay-
ments because they were clearly made "in connection with a redemption." See id. 
116. See Bailine & Booth, supra note 95, at 94 TNT 215-62. 
15
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that a corporation could deduct 
fees which it incurred in obtaining debt capital used to redeem 
stock even though § 162(k) disallows deduction of any expenses 
: incurred "in connection with" a stock redemption.1l7 The 
court reasoned that the fees were incurred in a separate bor-
rowing transaction which was not "in connection with" the 
stock redemption and, thus, allowed amortization and deduc-
tion of the loan fees as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses under § 162(a).1l8 
So far, the Ninth Circuit is the only United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals to decide whether § 162(k) applies to fees 
incurred in obtaining loans to finance a stock redemption.1l9 
However, this could change. Fort Howard Corp. intends to 
appeal the United States Tax Court decision in Fort Howard 
Corp. v. Commissioner120 to the Seventh Circuit. 121 If the 
Seventh Circuit were to affirm the tax court decision, a conflict 
between the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit would re-
sult, leaving the question to be resolved by the United States 
Supreme Court. 122 
Robert G. Lorndale, Jr.' 
117. In re Kroy (Europe) Limited, 27 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1994). 
118. See id. 
119. See Claudia MacLachlan, Conflict Emerges In Rulings On Fee Deductions; 
The Supreme Court May Have to Settle a Split Over Deducting Fees Paid In LBO 
Financings, NAT'!. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at A7. 
120. Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r, No. 6362-92, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63 
(T.C. Aug. 24, 1994). 
121. MacLachlan, supra note 119, at A7. See supra notes 56-61 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Fort Howard Corp. v. Comm'r. 
122. See MacLachlan, supra note 119, at A7. 
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